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techniques are  ‘deception by omission’,  ‘deception by saturation’ and the use of ‘deception by spin’. These 
techniques are newly analysed in the framework of the four canonical strategies of Information Warfare and  
Shannon’s capacity and entropy theorems, and their respective strengths and weaknesses established. Specific  










into models based upon the  four canonical strategies of Information Warfare, and explore their characteristics 
from the perspective  of  the  four  canonical  strategies.  The  focus  of  this  paper  is  on  the  mapping  of  these 
techniques. It is not intended to survey deceptive political and commercial product marketing case studies, or 
explore or comment on the history, motivation or ethics of such deceptions. Examples chosen have been done so 
as  they are well documented and provide clear instances of such deceptions. Some brief examples and case 































manipulate   the   opponent's   game   strategy   by   presenting   deceptive   information  which   alters   the   opponent's 
hypergame model of the player's subgame.
Definition:  The four canonical strategies of Information Warfare are defined thus (Kopp, 2003; 2006):
Degradation or Destruction [also  Denial  of  Information],  that  is  concealment  and camouflage,  or 
stealth; Degradation or Destruction amounts to making the signal sufficiently noise-like, that a receiver 
cannot discern its presence from that  of  the noise in the channel.  We can further divide degradation 
attacks into ‘active’ and ‘passive’, depending on whether the attacker generates the signal, or hides the 
signal.
Corruption [also Deception and Mimicry], that is the insertion of intentionally misleading information; 
corruption amounts to mimicking a known signal so well, that a receiver cannot distinguish the deceptive 
signal from the real signal. 
Denial  [also  Disruption  and  Destruction], that  is  the  insertion  of  information  which  produces  a 
dysfunction inside the opponent’s system; alternately the outright destruction of the receiver subsystem; 
Denial via disruption or destruction amounts to injecting so much noise into the channel, that the receiver 
cannot demodulate the signal. 
 Denial [also Subversion] , that is insertion of information which triggers a self destructive process in the 
opponent’s target system; Denial via subversion at the simplest level amounts to the diversion of the 
thread of execution within a Turing machine, which maps on to the functional behaviour of the victim 














Analysis of numerous case studies indicates  that at  the most fundamental  level of canonical and compound 
Information Warfare strategies and supporting techniques, internal propaganda aimed at a victim population is 
indistinguishable from classical deception techniques employed in intelligence or military operations  (Haswell, 







More generally, control of the channel and unconstrained choices in the use of  Corruption/Mimicry strategies 
cannot be assumed, especially where legislation or ownership impose hard limits on how the channel can be  




misleading  or  deceptive,   or   is   likely   to  mislead  or  deceive  (ABS,  2006;  ALII,2006).    Therefore  deception 





All of these techniques are designed to create a misperception of reality by either excluding unpalatable facts,  
or encouraging the victim to devalue or disregard unpalatable facts by accepting the ‘spin’ on the issue.
DECEPTION BY OMISSION
Deception  by  Omission  is   a   form  of  Passive  Degradation,   the   first   canonical   strategy.  The   attacker  hides 















1→ , inevitably I(m) 0→ , that is messages which are certain to arise tell the receiver nothing. If we define noise in 
this channel as being those messages without useful content, from the receiver’s perspective, then a basis exists 
for determining a mapping.


















The first  case study draws upon public  evidence provided by  the Australian Department  of  Defence  to  the 




acquire  the  Joint  Strike Fighter  as  Australia’s   future combat  aircraft.     In  the  context  of  Australian  military 
planning, historically such decisions were made on the basis of extensive analysis and study. Both the F­111 and 










Deception by Omission  arises frequently. Repeated instances include:
1. Avoidance of any discussion of material risks arising in the Joint Strike Fighter program, despite these 
attracting a large volume of press globally (FADT, 2003).
2. Avoidance of any detailed discussion of the capabilities of the competing F-22 fighter, despite this 
information being widely available in the public domain  (FADT, 2003).
3. Avoidance of any discussion of the adverse consequences of early retirement of the F-111 aircraft, 
despite these being extensively documented in the public domain  (FADT, 2003).
4. Avoidance of any discussion of the capabilities of competing foreign aircraft being acquired across the 
region and presenting a challenge to the Joint Strike Fighter, thus concealing its weaknesses (FADT, 
2003).
Case studies  of  Deception by Omission  in   the commercial  domain are also abundant.  A good summary of 
examples in the computer industry can be found in DeLamarter’s work, which presents and distills evidence 





A problem  arising   for   attackers  who   repeatedly  play   a  Deception  by  Omission  strategy   is   that   the  victim 





Deception by Saturation  arises in two forms, either as an  Active Degradation  attack,  or a  soft kill Denial by  










information content. Given  I(m)  is the information content of the message, and    p(m)  the probability of the 
message arising, then   where  p(m)  1→ , inevitably  I(m) 0→ , that is messages which are certain to arise tell the 
receiver nothing.
In effect the messages used to implement the attack can be considered to be noise in the channel, devoid of 
information content.  Where  the victim cannot  successfully   filter  a  message from the background noise,   for 
whatever reason,  the capacity of   the channel  will  degrade down to zero.    In terms of Shannon’s model for 












message  and   the  attack  succeeds.  Attacks  which  compromise   the  available  channel  bandwidth   rendering   it 
unusable are classified as soft kill Denial by Destruction attacks.
Deception by Saturation  remains widely used in marketing of commercial and political products, primarily as 
much   of   the   victim  population   is   unable   or   unwilling   to   invest   the   effort   required   to   filter  redundant   or 





1. Superficial but lengthy descriptions of the desirable attributes of the Joint Strike Fighter, none of which 
introduce any new information content (FADT, 2003; 2004).
2. Superficial but lengthy descriptions of the undesirable attributes, limitations or failings of the F-111, 








actual  information content from the  Deception by Saturation  attack conducted in such a specialised area of 
debate, the use of this strategy can be highly profitable. This also explains why this technique is commonly used 
in bureaucratic deceptions aimed at legislators (FADT, 2006B).








used as an effective defence mechanism. By constraining the size of  tender proposal documents,   the victim 
(client) can force the attacker (bidder) to maximise the ratio of P to N, within a constrained W.
In the most general sense, if a victim expects to be subjected to this regime of attack, prudent planning sees 
sufficient   resources  allocated  a priori  to  ensure   that  all  messages  can  be   read and  understood  properly   in 
reasonable time. This permits messages which are devoid of information content to be filtered and discarded.
DECEPTION BY SPIN
Deception by Spin  is  a   form of  Subversion  attack,  and  is  often used  in a  compound strategy supported by 
Deception By Omission, or sometimes Deception By Saturation. A spin attack is based on the idea of presenting 
an unpalatable or other acknowledged or accepted fact, but encouraging the victim to assess that fact from a 
perspective   which   is   less   damaging   to   the   attacker.   The   victim’s  mechanism   for   critically   assessing   the 
unpalatable fact is thus subverted. Other than this basic form of attack, an alternate form where the unwanted 








evidently  untruthful  message  content  amounts   to   the  use  of  a   supporting  Corruption  strategy  to   insert   the 
Subversion  into the victim’s mind.  Spin attacks, like  deception by omission attacks, rely on the victim having 
little  or  no  a priori  knowledge or  understanding,  and  the victim not  being  prepared  to  critically  analyse  a 
statement by the attacker. The use of spin attacks thus often relies on the trust of the victim, or victims who are 
fearful of losing confidence in the attacker. 
In   information   theoretical   and   information   processing   terms,  Deception   by   Spin  is   a   classical   compound 
















Foreign  Affairs,  Defence   and  Trade.   Instances  of  Deception  by   Spin  are   less   frequent   than  Deception   by  
Omission  and Deception by Saturation  in this case study, most likely due to the additional effort required to 
produce such a deception. Prominent instances include:
1. Repeated admissions of  F-111 groundings due to faults and failures, which are consistently explained 
as ‘age related’. As detailed analysis of each instance shows these were the result of poor engineering 
or planning, rather than age. The argument that age is the cause was intended to shift the manner in 
which the audience interprets the admitted failures to shift responsibility away from poor engineering 
or planning practices, and thus represents an excellent example of spin technique (FADT,2003).
2. The applicability of ‘throw weight’, a generalized measure of strike force potency, is explained to be 
irrelevant for  a variety of  reasons,  none of  which are actually pertinent to the argument.  This was 
intended to compel the audience to devalue the negative conclusions of a ‘throw weight’ analysis of the 
Defence position  (FADT, 2003; 2004).
3. The inability of the Joint Strike Fighter to compete with the larger F-111 in bomb carriage capabilities 
is explained to be irrelevant as future bombs will be smaller and lighter. As bomber potency scales with 
the number  of  smart  bombs carried,  this  argument is  intended to  deceptively lead the audience to 
disregard the actual limitations of Joint Strike Fighter and is thus a spin attack  (FADT,2003).
4. Projections of increased future F-111 operating costs, using irrelevant models and examples which do 
not fit the maintenance regime incurring these costs. The models and examples are used to compel the 
audience to disregard the reasons why these projections overstate the actual cost   (FADT,2003).





less  frequent  than deception by  the previous  tow techniques.  The best  single case study is   the widely used 
practice of stimulating  Fear Uncertainty and Doubt (FUD) in customers. The unwanted (by the attacker) impact 










Bernays later  repeated this   type of  spin attack during the Philco Radio campaign, where a  lack of  affluent 
consumer market penetration by radio receiver products was countered by the launching of a gala black tie event 
at a prestigious Rockefeller Plaza gallery in New York   (MPRW, 2006B).




avoids  the weakness in  most common spin  attacks,  where  the adverse reality is  visibly connected with  the 
argument as to why it is not important.





the framework of   the four  canonical  strategies of   Information Warfare and Shannon’s capacity and entropy 
theorems. These deceptions are characterised by  the wide use of   three techniques,  Deception by Omission,  
Deception by Saturation and Deception by Spin, usually employed as part of compound strategies. 
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